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Korean Stocks: From Overlooked to Overheated

Investing in Korea

Before he became the president who turned South Korea into the world’s hottest stock market, Lee Jae-myung was a thirty-something day trader who lost money month after month. He has spoken about it openly, the bad bets, the losing streak, the humbling reality of trying to make money in a market rigged against ordinary investors. So when he ran for president in 2025 on a platform built partly around fixing the Korean stock market, and pledged to invest one million won of his own money every month if elected, people paid attention. Not because a politician had promised stock market reform before, but because this one had lost money in it personally and seemed to understand exactly why.

Lee won. The KOSPI index stood at 2,831 on the day he took office. It hit 8,124 by May 2026. That is a 187% increase. For context, the S&P 500 returned around 10% annualised over the same period. The Korean stock market went from being one of the most chronically undervalued major markets in the world to the strongest performer among developed markets in 2025 and into 2026. The Korea discount, a term that had defined the market for decades, is being replaced in financial media by a new phrase: the Korea premium.

Why the Korea Discount Existed

For anyone considering investing in Korea, the first thing to understand is why the market was cheap to begin with. The Korea discount is not a myth or an anomaly. It was a documented, persistent, structural phenomenon. As recently as 2024, nearly 65% of KOSPI-listed companies were trading below 1x price-to-book value, meaning the market was valuing them at less than the sum of their assets. In the S&P 500, that figure was 6%.

South Korea has the 13th largest stock market in the world by capitalisation, with 2,558 listed companies. It produces Samsung, SK Hynix, Hyundai, LG, and POSCO. Its semiconductor industry makes the high-bandwidth memory chips that every AI data centre on earth depends on. By any fundamental measure, this is an advanced economy with globally competitive industries. And global investors, for decades, priced it like a second-tier emerging market.

The reasons are structural. Korean companies have historically returned very little capital to shareholders. Low dividends, minimal buybacks, and opaque conglomerate structures gave outside investors limited ability to extract value even when the underlying businesses performed well. Return on equity across Korean listed companies has averaged around 7% over the past decade, roughly half the level of comparable developed market peers. And then there are the chaebols.

The Chaebols Built Korea and Kept It Cheap

Chaebol, loosely translated, means financial clique. These are the sprawling family-controlled conglomerates, Samsung, Hyundai, SK Group, LG, Lotte, that were built with direct government support during Korea’s industrialisation in the 1960s and 70s and now account for roughly 60% of the country’s GDP. They are extraordinary engines of industrial scale. They are also, from an investor’s perspective, a governance nightmare.

The founding families retain control through complex webs of cross-shareholdings that let them direct companies they don’t technically own a majority of. Boards are dominated by insiders. Minority shareholders have historically had limited recourse when controlling families make decisions that benefit the family rather than the company. One of the most watched metrics in Korean corporate governance is the holding company discount, the gap between what a chaebol’s holding company trades at versus the sum of its listed subsidiaries. That discount, often 50% or more, is the market’s way of pricing in the risk of family self-dealing.

Chaebols have also been convicted of it. Samsung’s Lee Jae-yong was convicted of bribery in the Park Geun-hye corruption scandal. Hyundai’s Chung family has faced multiple governance controversies. The pattern is consistent enough that for years, investing in Korea meant accepting that the people running the companies you owned were not necessarily running them for you.

The Value-Up Program and What Changed

The reform push began before Lee. In February 2024, Korea’s Financial Services Commission launched the Corporate Value-Up Program, inspired by Japan’s equivalent initiative that had helped re-rate Japanese equities significantly over the previous decade. The programme encouraged listed companies to voluntarily disclose plans to improve their price-to-book ratios, raise returns on equity, and increase shareholder distributions. Voluntary is the operative word. The initial reception was lukewarm. Chaebols, unsurprisingly, were in no hurry to voluntarily dilute the control structures that had served the founding families for generations.

Then came the political turbulence of late 2024, a constitutional crisis that accelerated the snap election and brought Lee to power. His administration moved faster and harder than anyone expected. In July 2025, amendments to the Commercial Act were passed expanding directors’ fiduciary duties to explicitly include all shareholders, not just company stakeholders. Independent director requirements were tightened. Cumulative voting rules were strengthened to give minority investors more influence in board elections. A dividend tax overhaul was launched to make shareholder returns more attractive. And Lee personally attended the Korea Investment Summit at the New York Stock Exchange in September 2025 to pitch the reform story directly to global asset managers.

The market responded. The KOSPI hit 5,000 in January 2026 and kept going. Foreign capital inflows into Korean equities picked up sharply from mid-2025. SK Hynix’s share price rose 10 times from Lee’s first day in office. Samsung Electronics rose 5.6 times. Both joined the list of companies globally valued at over $1 trillion. SK Hynix’s $26.5 billion US IPO in July 2026 was the largest ever by a foreign company on American exchanges.

Two Companies Are Carrying the Whole Index

Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix together now account for 55.5% of total KOSPI market capitalisation, up from 22% at the end of 2023. The Korean stock market’s extraordinary performance is, in large part, the story of two semiconductor companies benefitting from the AI chip supercycle. Earnings projections for KOSPI-listed companies excluding those two were revised upward by 48% in May 2026. Including them, the figure was 261%. Strip out Samsung and SK Hynix and Korea’s rally looks considerably less dramatic.

The Value-Up Programme remains voluntary. Chaebols have shown willingness to engage with the reform agenda when it is in their interest and resistance when it isn’t. The cultural shift from control-first to shareholder-centric governance, if it happens at all, will take a decade, not a presidential term. And the latest surge in the KOSPI has been partly driven by retail investors, some of them entirely new to the market, some using borrowed money, which is exactly the kind of speculative participation that precedes corrections.

CSIS noted in July 2026 that many foreign investors had already taken profits and exited positions, with the most recent market gains driven primarily by domestic retail flows. The president who was once a losing day trader has minted a generation of new ones. Whether they fare better than he did remains to be seen.

The Discount Is Closing.

Korean equities still trade at 10.8 times earnings against 15.4 times for the broader Asia Pacific market. Even after the rally, global investors remain sceptical that the governance changes will stick, and they have good historical reasons to be. Every previous Korean reform push disappointed.

MSCI Developed Market inclusion remains unresolved. Inclusion would force passive funds globally to allocate to Korean equities and bring an estimated $50 to $100 billion in automatic inflows. It would also require Korea to meet transparency and market access standards the current reform push is pointing toward but hasn’t reached. The chaebols that built the discount aren’t gone. They are adapting, selectively, on their own terms.

What is different this time is a president who personally lost money in the market he is now trying to fix, a semiconductor supercycle generating earnings that justify the rally on fundamentals, and a generation of retail investors with real skin in the game. Whether that combination holds long enough for the structural reforms to become irreversible is the question every investor in Korea is now sitting with.

Sources

Korea Economic Institute

CSIS

Baillie Gifford

Washington Times

AMRO Asia


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