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Napoleon Built the EU. He Just Didn’t Live to See It.

In 1805, Napoleon Bonaparte told a general that he wanted to create “a European legal system, a European appeal

Napoleon Built the EU. He Just Didn’t Live to See It.

In 1805, Napoleon Bonaparte told a general that he wanted to create “a European legal system, a European appeal court, a common currency, the same weights and measures, the same laws.” He wanted to make of all the peoples of Europe one people. He was, at the time, preparing to go to war with most of them.

Two hundred and sixteen years later, the European Union completed what Napoleon started. It has a single market, a common currency used by 20 of its member states, harmonised weights and measures across the continent, and a legal framework that supersedes national law in dozens of policy areas. The founding members of the EU’s predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951, were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Every one of them had been either conquered by Napoleon or shaped directly by his legal and administrative reforms.

Britain was not among them. Britain was never conquered by Napoleon. It has also now left the EU.

The connection between those two facts is not coincidental. It is, arguably, the longest-running consequence of the Napoleonic Wars.

What Europe Looked Like Before Napoleon

Before Napoleon’s armies crossed the Rhine, continental Europe was a patchwork of feudal legal systems, local currencies, incompatible weights and measures, and internal customs barriers that made trade between neighbouring towns more complicated than trade between continents is today.

France alone had over 360 different legal codes before the Revolution. A contract signed in Paris was unenforceable in Bordeaux under different customary law. Guilds controlled who could practice which trades in which towns. Feudal dues extracted wealth from peasants in favour of landowners whose privileges were written into dozens of overlapping local charters. Before Napoleon, there was no such thing as a French legal system. There were hundreds of French legal systems, stitched together by centuries of royal decree, local tradition, and inherited privilege.

The same was true across Germany, Italy, and the territories that would eventually become Belgium and the Netherlands. The Holy Roman Empire, which nominally unified much of central Europe, was in practice 300 separate principalities, each with its own laws, tariffs, and currencies. A merchant moving goods from Hamburg to Vienna crossed dozens of customs borders and paid duties at each one. The transaction costs of doing business across Europe were enormous.

Napoleon understood, with the clarity of someone who had to move armies and supply chains across the continent, that this fragmentation was not just politically inconvenient. It was economically ruinous.

The Napoleonic Code, promulgated in 1804, was the first modern legal framework to be adopted at a pan-European scale. It established equality before the law, abolished feudal privileges, codified property rights, standardised contract law, and created a secular state that separated civil authority from religious institutions.

Napoleon imposed it on every territory his armies occupied. Belgium, Luxembourg, the western German states, the Netherlands, significant parts of Italy, Switzerland, and Poland all received the Code. By 1810, a merchant operating across much of the continent was working within a broadly compatible legal framework for the first time in European history. Contracts were enforceable across borders. Property rights were consistent. The guild system that had restricted entry into trades for centuries was dismantled.

The Code did not disappear when Napoleon fell. France and most of the countries that had adopted it retained it after the Bourbon restoration in 1815. Belgium still operates under a version of it. Luxembourg does too. The Italian Civil Code, established after unification in 1865, was built directly from it. The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 incorporated its structure and principles. The Swiss Civil Code of 1907 merged it with local traditions. The legal architecture of western Europe, the foundation on which the EU’s single market would eventually be constructed, was laid by a Corsican general who wanted to standardise the paperwork for his supply lines.

The Zollverein and the First Single Market

Napoleon’s fall in 1815 left Germany fragmented into 39 states, each with its own laws and customs arrangements. The Napoleonic Code had been in force in the Rhineland and other western German territories for over a decade. The legal and administrative reforms that accompanied it had dismantled the guild system, established property rights, and created a class of merchants and manufacturers who understood what frictionless trade looked like and wanted more of it.

In 1818, Prussia abolished its internal customs duties and began inviting neighbouring states to join a common customs arrangement. Over the next sixteen years, the German states negotiated their way into what became, on January 1, 1834, the Zollverein, or German Customs Union. Thirty-nine states reduced to a single customs territory. Internal tariffs abolished. A common external tariff applied at the borders. Weights and measures standardised across the union.

Historians at Cambridge’s Journal of Institutional Economics have described the Zollverein as the first international customs union and the direct institutional template for the European Union. It was the first time in history that independent sovereign states created a full economic union without simultaneously creating a political federation. The EU, two centuries later, is operating on the same architecture.

The only major German state excluded from the Zollverein was Austria, which refused to break up its customs territory. Austria’s exclusion from the customs union in 1834 contributed directly to its exclusion from German political unification in 1871. The country that stayed outside the economic bloc found itself, eventually, outside the political one. A pattern that would repeat, at larger scale, in the twentieth century.

The Country That Stayed Out

Britain watched all of this from across the Channel and declined to participate.

This was not passive detachment. Britain had spent the Napoleonic Wars financing coalitions against France, blockading French ports, funding allied armies, and fighting the most expensive conflict in its history to that point. The national debt reached £679 million by 1814, more than double GDP. Britain fought Napoleon to a standstill, and when he fell, it had no interest in inheriting his project.

Napoleon had said in 1805 that he wanted to make one people of all the peoples of Europe. Many in Britain did not want to be one people with the peoples of Europe. They had an empire to run. Between 1793 and the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had been forced to find new markets after being cut off from the continent by Napoleon’s Continental System blockade. It had expanded trade with Asia, Africa, and South America. The empire, which at its peak would cover a quarter of all the land on earth, was both the cause and the consequence of Britain’s orientation away from its immediate neighbours.

By the time the Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951, Britain was still running an empire and still considered itself a global power of a different category to France and Germany. It declined to join. It joined the precursor to the EU only in 1973, remained perpetually ambivalent about deeper integration, never adopted the euro, never joined Schengen, and voted to leave entirely in 2016.

The countries that joined enthusiastically, that built the EU and continue to anchor it, are the ones whose legal systems, administrative structures, and economic frameworks were shaped by Napoleon’s conquests. The country that resisted Napoleon most effectively is the one that never fully accepted what he was trying to build.

The Legacy That Outlasted the Man

Napoleon is remembered in the English-speaking world primarily as a military figure. The man who was stopped at Waterloo and exiled to die on a rock in the South Atlantic. His legacy is understood as conquest, and conquest is understood as something that ended when he did.

The economic and legal legacy tells a different story. The Napoleonic Code remains the foundation of civil law across most of continental Europe, in Louisiana, in Quebec, in large parts of Latin America, in Egypt, in Lebanon, and in dozens of other jurisdictions that adopted it during the nineteenth century. The institutional architecture of economic integration that produced the EU, from the Zollverein to the Coal and Steel Community to the single market, runs in a direct line from the administrative reforms Napoleon imposed on conquered territories between 1804 and 1815.

He did not set out to build the EU. Bonaparte set out to control Europe, defeat Britain, and create a unified imperial system under French dominance. He failed at all three. But the legal codes, the abolished feudal systems, the standardised weights and measures, the administrative frameworks that made cross-border trade legible for the first time, proved more durable than the empire itself.

The EU is not Napoleon’s project completed. It is what grew in the soil he turned over. The founders of the Coal and Steel Community, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, were not Bonapartists. They were men trying to prevent another European war by binding former enemies together with economic interdependence. But the ground they built on had been prepared two centuries earlier, by armies that had nothing of the sort in mind.

Napoleon said he wanted one people. He got a single market. Given the choice, he probably would have preferred the former. History, as it tends to, gave him the latter instead.

Sources:

Britannica – Napoleonic Code

Cambridge Core – The Zollverein and the Origins of the Customs Union

Quartz – A History Lesson That Explains Britain’s Aloofness From Europe

TIME – It’s Complicated: Britain Has Always Struggled to Define Its Relationship With Europe

Lumen Learning – The Napoleonic Code


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Conor Healy

Conor Timothy Healy is a Brand Specialist at Tokyo Design Studio Australia and contributor to Ex Nihilo Magazine and Design Magazine.

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