Saudi Arabia Megaprojects: Nine Years Into Vision 2030
Saudi Arabia megaprojects are diverging into winners and losers. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 promised over $1
Saudi Arabia megaprojects are diverging into winners and losers. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 promised over $1 trillion in developments to diversify the economy beyond oil. Nine years later, the kingdom is making hard choices about what actually gets built.
NEOM’s flagship “The Line” has been slashed from 170 kilometers to just 2.4 kilometers by 2030 – a 98.6% reduction. The workforce dropped 35%, vendors face payment delays, and the $1.5 trillion budget looks impossible to fund. The gap between promotional videos and construction reality has become undeniable.
But while NEOM collapses, other Saudi Arabia megaprojects thrive. Red Sea resorts are opening. Qiddiya entertainment parks progress. Diriyah heritage development continues. The kingdom awarded $196 billion in new contracts in 2025, up 20% from 2024. The money flows to achievable projects serving domestic needs rather than speculative desert experiments.
NEOM: The 98% Downsize
The Line was supposed to be revolutionary – 170 kilometers of car-free linear city housing 1.5 million people in the desert. Now only 2.4 kilometers will be completed by 2030, accommodating 300,000 residents. The downsize happened quietly through 2024-2025 as costs spiraled and construction reality collided with promotional videos.
NEOM’s Sindalah island resort opened in 2024, three years late and at triple the initial budget. This pattern of delays and cost overruns forced the reassessment. Construction crews were cut 35% since April 2025. Vendors report deferred payments. The workforce reductions weren’t efficiency improvements – they reflected inability to sustain construction at planned scale.
Despite claims that the full 170-kilometer vision remains viable “eventually,” current work focuses entirely on the 2.4-kilometer section with no funding committed for the rest. The gap between official rhetoric and construction reality has become impossible to ignore.
Red Sea: Actually Opening
Red Sea Global presents a different picture. The luxury tourism project opened its first hotels in 2023 and continues development. Phase one includes resorts on Shura Island designed by international architects, with additional properties opening through 2024-2025. This represents one of the few Saudi Arabia megaprojects delivering tangible results.
The Red Sea project works because it follows proven models: beach resorts for wealthy tourists. Unlike NEOM’s experimental urban concepts, Red Sea developments use conventional hospitality design adapted to local conditions. Costs remain high and timelines slip, but the fundamental concept makes sense in ways The Line never did.
International hotel brands including Six Senses and Ritz-Carlton have committed to Red Sea properties, providing operational expertise Saudi developers lack. This partnership model helps Red Sea avoid some execution problems plaguing projects that attempt everything in-house.
Qiddiya: Theme Parks and Sports
Qiddiya’s entertainment development outside Riyadh continues with Six Flags theme park and sports venues under construction. The project targets domestic Saudi tourism and entertainment rather than international visitors, making demand more predictable than projects depending on attracting foreign tourists to the kingdom.
Opening timeline has shifted from 2023 to 2025 and now targets phased completion through 2030. Cost estimates have risen but the project maintains momentum because it serves clear needs: young Saudis want entertainment options currently unavailable domestically. Unlike NEOM’s speculative urbanism, Qiddiya addresses actual demand.
The sports facilities tie into Saudi Arabia’s push into international sports through LIV Golf, Formula 1, and World Cup 2034 hosting. These mega-events create deadlines forcing completion of sports infrastructure even if entertainment components slip further.
Diriyah: Historic District Development
Diriyah Gate Authority is developing the historic site near Riyadh into a cultural and hospitality destination. This represents the most conventional of Saudi Arabia megaprojects – historic preservation combined with luxury hotels and retail. Opening phases began in 2024 with additional sections completing through 2026.
Diriyah succeeds through realistic scope. Rather than inventing new urban forms, it renovates existing historic areas and adds hotels. The cultural tourism angle attracts visitors interested in Arabian heritage, a smaller but more reliably interested audience than mass tourism projections underlying other megaprojects.
Contract awards for Diriyah development increased through 2024-2025, indicating confidence in the project’s viability. The relatively modest $17 billion budget makes Diriyah achievable even under constrained oil revenue scenarios.
ROSHN: Mass Housing
ROSHN focuses on building communities for Saudi citizens rather than attracting international investment or tourism. The project delivered its first homes in 2023 and continues development across multiple sites. This addresses genuine housing demand for the kingdom’s growing young population.
ROSHN represents the unglamorous side of Vision 2030 – building thousands of residential units using conventional construction. It doesn’t generate international headlines like NEOM but actually delivers housing Saudis need. This practical focus explains why ROSHN maintains funding even as more speculative projects get scaled back.
The Budget Reality
Saudi Arabia needs oil at $96.20 per barrel to balance its budget according to IMF analysis. Oil prices well below this level created budget deficits hitting 4% of GDP in 2025. The kingdom recorded surpluses when oil prices were high but now faces sustained deficits that force prioritization across Saudi Arabia megaprojects.
NEOM alone costs an estimated $1.5 trillion. Combined with other Vision 2030 commitments, total obligations exceed what the kingdom can fund at current oil prices without depleting reserves. The prioritization became clear through 2024-2025: Riyadh and Red Sea projects receive funding while NEOM outlays slow dramatically.
Of $1.55 trillion in planned developments, contracts worth $196 billion were awarded in 2025 – up 20% from 2024. This shows continued commitment to Saudi Arabia megaprojects but increasingly directed toward achievable near-term developments rather than speculative long-term visions.
What Gets Built and What Gets Abandoned
The pattern across Saudi Arabia megaprojects reveals clear prioritization. Projects serving Saudi citizens (ROSHN housing, Qiddiya entertainment) and projects following proven models (Red Sea resorts, Diriyah heritage tourism) receive continued funding. Projects attempting revolutionary new concepts (NEOM’s linear city) or depending on optimistic international tourism projections get scaled back.
Riyadh developments take priority because improving the capital delivers immediate benefits to citizens and creates better environment for international business. Unlike NEOM’s empty desert site, Riyadh offers existing population, infrastructure, and economic activity that make developments lower risk.
The selective approach makes financial sense but undermines the transformational rhetoric that initially defined Vision 2030. Building conventional developments solves immediate needs but doesn’t revolutionize the kingdom’s economy or reduce oil dependence as dramatically as originally promised.
The Tourism Gamble
Vision 2030 originally targeted 100 million tourists by 2030. Saudi Arabia exceeded this in 2023, prompting a revised target of 150 million. But the majority are religious pilgrims performing Hajj and Umrah rather than leisure tourists attracted by Saudi Arabia megaprojects.
Red Sea aims to attract international leisure tourists, but actual visitor numbers remain minimal compared to projections. Building luxury resorts doesn’t automatically fill them with guests willing to pay premium prices. Saudi Arabia faces fundamental tourism challenges: conservative social environment, alcohol prohibition, hot climate, and limited cultural attractions beyond religious sites.
The kingdom’s sports investments and mega-event hosting attempt to boost tourism appeal, but sustainable leisure tourism requires more than occasional events. Changing international perceptions takes decades, not years. The tourism targets embedded in Saudi Arabia megaprojects assume rapid transformation that may not materialize.
International Investment and Execution
Saudi Arabia megaprojects require massive international investment beyond government funding. While initial announcements attracted interest from global firms, enthusiasm waned as projects faced delays, cost overruns, and downsizing decisions.
NEOM’s controversies including forced displacement of local tribes and reported worker deaths create reputational risks international investors increasingly avoid. The Khashoggi killing and regional conflicts further complicate partnerships. These political factors affect NEOM more than domestic-focused projects like ROSHN and Qiddiya.
Payment delays reported by contractors create negative feedback where firms become more cautious about Saudi work. This slows execution and potentially increases costs as fewer companies compete for contracts. Projects with clearer cash flow like Red Sea maintain better contractor relationships than NEOM’s uncertain funding.
The 2030 Timeline Problem
Vision 2030 set 2030 as the target year for transformation, leaving five years from 2025. Completing scaled-down versions of Saudi Arabia megaprojects appears achievable, but these smaller developments won’t catalyze the economic diversification Vision 2030 promised.
NEOM’s 2.4-kilometer Line by 2030 represents a tiny fraction of the revolutionary linear city vision. Red Sea and Qiddiya will deliver working resorts and entertainment, but at scales that don’t fundamentally transform Saudi Arabia’s economy. Diriyah and ROSHN provide concrete benefits but represent conventional development rather than transformation.
The timeline pressure forces pragmatic choices. The kingdom can deliver some completed projects by 2030 by focusing on achievable goals, or it can maintain ambitious timelines for revolutionary projects that won’t materialize. Saudi Arabia increasingly chooses the former while maintaining rhetorical commitment to the latter.
What Vision 2030 Actually Achieves
The realistic outcome for Saudi Arabia megaprojects involves partial success across multiple dimensions. NEOM delivers a small demonstration section rather than revolutionary linear city. Red Sea creates functioning luxury tourism destination serving niche international market. Qiddiya provides entertainment options for domestic population. Diriyah offers heritage tourism. ROSHN builds needed housing.
These outcomes represent meaningful development but not the transformational change initially promised. Saudi Arabia will have better tourism infrastructure, more housing, and improved entertainment options. But oil dependence won’t decrease significantly, and the economy won’t diversify dramatically. The megaprojects improve quality of life for Saudis without fundamentally changing the kingdom’s economic model.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reputation remains tied to Vision 2030’s perception. The scaled-back approach allows claiming success through completed projects while avoiding complete failure of abandoned developments. Whether this satisfies domestic and international audiences depends partly on how aggressively critics highlight gaps between promises and reality.
The downsizing of Saudi Arabia megaprojects shows pragmatic adjustment to financial constraints. NEOM’s dramatic scaling back grabs headlines, but continued progress on Red Sea, Qiddiya, Diriyah, and ROSHN demonstrates selective rather than wholesale retreat. The kingdom is building what it can afford while maintaining rhetorical commitment to revolutionary visions that may never materialize. Whether this constitutes success or failure depends on which original promises you believed and what outcomes you consider meaningful.
Sources:
- Gulf News: The Line scaled from 170km to 2.4km, population target 1.5M to 300k
- MEP Middle East: Construction workforce reduced 35% since April 2025
- CNBC: NEOM estimated at $1.5 trillion
- Semafor: $196B contracts awarded in 2025, up 20% from 2024
- OilPrice.com: Saudi Arabia needs $96.20/barrel to balance budget
- Red Sea Global: First resorts opened 2023, continued development
- Qiddiya Investment Company: Entertainment development timeline and sports facilities
