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Why The Strait of Hormuz Controls Your Petrol Price

A 33-kilometre stretch of water between Iran and Oman is the reason your last fill-up cost £14 more than

Why  The Strait of Hormuz Controls Your Petrol Price

A 33-kilometre stretch of water between Iran and Oman is the reason your last fill-up cost £14 more than it did a year ago. Most drivers have never heard of the Strait of Hormuz. Every one of them is paying for what’s happening there.

As of early June 2026, the average UK petrol price stood at 158.74p a litre, with diesel at 184.11p. A year earlier, in mid-May 2025, petrol averaged 132.32p and diesel 139.20p. Unleaded alone has gone up by more than 26p a litre since last spring, adding roughly £14 to a typical 55-litre fill. None of that is down to UK fuel retailers, refineries, or tax changes. The Strait of Hormuz petrol price link is down to a waterway most British drivers couldn’t point to on a map.

A Narrow Strip of Water That Moves the World’s Oil

The Strait of Hormuz sits between Iran’s southern coast and Oman, connecting the Persian Gulf to the open ocean. At its narrowest point, it’s just 33 kilometres wide. Through that gap passes roughly 20% of the world’s seaborne oil supply and 20% of global liquefied natural gas, including the bulk of crude exports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran itself.

There’s no real alternative route. A handful of pipelines, including Saudi Arabia’s east-west line to the Red Sea, can carry some oil around the bottleneck, but only a fraction of what normally moves by tanker. When the Strait is disrupted, that oil doesn’t simply find another way out. It mostly just stops moving.

For decades, Iran threatened to close the Strait whenever tensions with the West flared, and traders shrugged it off as a familiar bluff. Before 2026, it had never actually happened for any extended period.

The 28 February Strikes

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes on Iran, targeting nuclear sites, military facilities, and senior leadership, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the process. Iran responded with missile attacks on Israel and on US bases across the Gulf, and within days, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps began transmitting warnings that ships could no longer pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

This time it wasn’t a bluff. The IRGC boarded and attacked merchant vessels, laid sea mines, and on 4 March formally declared the Strait closed to ships travelling “to and from” the US, Israel, and their allies. Tanker traffic, which normally runs at around 3,000 vessels a month, collapsed by more than 90% within days. The International Maritime Organization reported that roughly 20,000 mariners and 2,000 ships were left stranded in the Persian Gulf.

China, Iran’s largest oil customer, was allowed to keep moving cargo through, and ships began broadcasting “CHINA OWNER” over radio to pass safely. Everyone else was largely locked out. QatarEnergy declared force majeure on its LNG shipments on 4 March after attacks on its export facilities, pulling roughly a fifth of the world’s LNG supply out of the market overnight.

How a War 3,500 Miles Away Reaches a British Forecourt

The mechanism behind the Strait of Hormuz petrol price link is shorter than most people assume.

The UK doesn’t produce enough crude to meet its own needs and imports the majority of its refined fuel. Wholesale prices are set almost entirely by the global Brent crude benchmark, traded in dollars on international markets. When Brent rises, UK fuel buyers face higher costs within days, because the domestic supply chain runs on short-term and spot contracts rather than long, hedged positions that might smooth out the shock. There is essentially no buffer. A jump in Brent typically reaches the forecourt within two to five working days.

Brent crude opened 2026 at $61 a barrel. By the end of the first quarter, after the strikes and the closure, it had reached $118, the steepest quarterly rise on record after adjusting for inflation since 1988. It eased somewhat through April as a fragile ceasefire briefly took hold and tanker traffic partially recovered, dropping back toward $80. But the calm didn’t last. Iran declared the Strait “completely open” on 17 April, then reversed itself a day later after renewed Israeli strikes on Lebanon. By mid-May, Brent was back above $110, and as of June, with peace talks stalled, it remains elevated there.

UK pump prices tracked every one of those moves, confirming just how tightly the Strait of Hormuz petrol price relationship holds in practice. The House of Commons Library recorded petrol rising 12p a litre and diesel 25p in the first three weeks after the strikes began. Diesel rose every single day for 40 consecutive days before its first small dip in mid-April, eventually peaking at 192.14p before easing slightly. Petrol peaked close to 159p in late May and has stayed within a fraction of that level since.

Why a Ceasefire Might Not Fix It

The natural assumption is that once the fighting stops, prices snap back. Energy analysts increasingly think that’s wrong.

“No matter what happens, the Iranians will control the Strait of Hormuz for the foreseeable future,” Amos Hochstein, a former US energy envoy, told CNBC. “It doesn’t even matter what the deal says. Everybody in the region believes that.” Helima Croft, head of global commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets, has told clients that any settlement leaving Iran with practical control over the waterway will mean permanently lower traffic, with shipping potentially settling at 60–70% of pre-war volumes, Chinese-affiliated vessels moving freely whilst Western ships need individual agreements with Tehran to pass safely.

There’s a precedent for this kind of damage outlasting the conflict that caused it. Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping in late 2023 cut daily transits through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait from 75 ships to 31 within ten weeks. The attacks stopped over a year ago. Traffic still hasn’t recovered. Shipowners simply stopped trusting the route, and trust doesn’t return as quickly as missiles stop firing. The UAE’s own state oil company has estimated that full flows through Hormuz won’t resume until 2027 even under an optimistic, swiftly negotiated deal.

Iran has also begun operating what shipping intelligence firm Lloyd’s List describes as a “toll booth” system, requiring vessels to register with the Revolutionary Guard or rely on a diplomatic arrangement between their flag state and Tehran before transiting safely. Reuters and the BBC have both reported Asian nations quietly striking such bilateral arrangements. A waterway that used to be free and open under international maritime law is increasingly operating as Iranian-administered territory in practice, regardless of what any future ceasefire document says on paper.

What the Government Has Done About It

Westminster’s main lever has been delay rather than cure. The 5p-a-litre cut to fuel duty, due to start unwinding in September 2026, was extended to the end of December because of the conflict and rising pump prices. Duty is now scheduled to rise by 1p in September, a further 2p in December, and another 2p in March 2027, eventually returning to 57.95p a litre, with inflation-linked rises resuming from April 2027. Drivers get a few extra months of relief. The bill simply arrives later.

Separately, since February 2026, every UK fuel retailer has been required to report pump prices within 30 minutes under the new Fuel Finder scheme, following Competition and Markets Authority findings that weak competition between forecourts meant some drivers were paying up to 20p a litre more than others a few miles down the road. It won’t lower the global oil price, but it at least stops drivers overpaying on top of a crisis they can’t control.

The 32 members of the International Energy Agency, including the UK, released 400 million barrels from emergency reserves to cushion the shock. That sounds substantial until you realise it covers roughly four days of global demand. It buys negotiators time. It isn’t a fix.

It Doesn’t Stop at the Pump

The Strait doesn’t just carry oil. Roughly a third of Britain’s gas supply arrives as LNG, much of it shipped through or near the same waters, and gas-fired power stations typically set the UK’s wholesale electricity price. When LNG tightens, household electricity bills rise alongside the petrol price, via the quarterly Ofgem price cap reset.

The squeeze reaches further still. Haulage runs on diesel, and nearly everything on a supermarket shelf arrives by road at some point in its journey. When delivery diesel costs more, those costs tend to show up at the checkout rather than disappear into a haulier’s margin. Engine oil, lubricants, and tyres, all oil-derived, cost more too, pushing up garage and servicing bills regardless of what fuel a car runs on.

The Uncomfortable Trade-off

President Trump has pushed China to help guarantee safe passage through the Strait, pointing out that China relies on the route for roughly 90% of its energy imports and shouldn’t leave the security burden solely to the US Navy. China has called for freedom of navigation as “the shared call of the international community” while, alongside Russia, vetoing a UN Security Council resolution in April aimed at protecting commercial shipping there. Everyone wants the oil moving. Nobody wants to be the one paying to guarantee it, or to hand a rival the credit for reopening it.

For a British driver filling up a car, none of that geopolitical positioning matters directly. What matters is that a stretch of water 3,500 miles away, controlled by a country Britain has no say over, sets the price of a litre of unleaded more reliably than anything happening at a UK forecourt, refinery, or Budget statement. The Strait of Hormuz petrol price connection isn’t an abstract economics lesson. The pump is just where the bill finally arrives.

Sources


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Malvin Simpson

Malvin Christopher Simpson is a Content Specialist at Tokyo Design Studio Australia and contributor to Ex Nihilo Magazine.

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